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CYBER-SECURITY RISKS OF FEDWIRE
Mark J. Bilger
Norwich University
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ABSTRACT
This paper will review the risks associated with the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire network as
a key resource necessary for the efficient function of the American financial system. It will
examine the business model of the Fedwire system of real-time interbank transfers, the
network characteristics of Fedwire, and the possibility of a successful attack on Fedwire and
its potential impact on the U.S. financial system.
Keywords: Banking, Cyber-attack, Federal Reserve, Fedwire, Payment Networks.
1. THE CORE OF
AMERICAN BANKING
Experts estimate the global gross domestic
product (GDP) in 2017 was approximately
$75 trillion - of which the United States
GDP was the largest at 18 percent (Statis-
tica, 2019). The central bank of the United
States is the Federal Reserve Bank (The
Fed). Central banks play key roles in na-
tional economies by setting key interest rates,
and influencing their commercial banking sys-
tems. As the Federal Reserve (2017) states,
in establishing the Federal Reserve System,
the United States was divided geographically
into 12 Districts, each with a separately incor-
porated Reserve Bank. District boundaries
were based on prevailing trade regions that
existed in 1913 and related economic consid-
erations, so they do not necessarily coincide
with state lines” (para. 2).
The New York Federal Reserve Bank, lo-
cated at 33 Liberty Street in Manhattan,
manages more than half of the assets on
the Fed’s balance sheet. Author and profes-
sor of computer science Ted G. Lewis (2015)
describes the New York Federal Reserve
Bank simply as, “...the central hub of
the banking system network” (p. 313).
The Fed enables the transfer of funds between
banks who maintain Federal Reserve accounts
through the Fedwire Funds Service. Fedwire
is a real-time settlement system. Fedwire
transfers are one-way, which means banks can
wire funds out, but cannot debit other banks
and wire funds in. Fedwire is a payment
system and does not perform the traditional
banking functions of managing deposits and
withdrawals. It simply transfers funds be-
tween accounts within the Federal Reserve
System. Once Fedwire transactions are com-
plete, they are irrevocable.
2. ORIGIN AND
HISTORY
After the creation of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem in 1913, the Fed began to offer leased-
wire communications to enable the transfer of
funds among the Reserve Banks and to mem-
ber banks. This eliminated the previous need
for regional exchanges that existed to ship
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gold and currency between regions within the
United States (Gilbert, Hunt, Winch, 1997,
p.2). Fedwire began operation in 1918 using
Morse-coded transfers on the Fed’s private
telegraphy network (Lewis, 2015, p. 316).
Fedwire’s book-entry transfers of account bal-
ances were a vast improvement over physical
transfers of financial assets like gold, silver,
and currency.
Fedwire evolved gradually from telegraphy
to a public switched network of telex tele-
printers, and finally to digital telecommuni-
cations (Federal Reserve, 2014, section Brief
History, para. 2). With the advent of general-
purpose commercial computing technologies
in the 1960s, each Federal Reserve Bank de-
ployed its own software, programmers, and
data processing centers. We know this be-
cause the Federal Reserve admits that in the
1980s, it consolidated all Fedwire services
onto a single software platform across all Re-
serve Banks (section Brief History, para. 3).
Today, the Fedwire system is combined into
a single network, FEDNET, which employs a
common proprietary protocol for funds trans-
fer (Gilbert, Hunt, Winch, 1997, p.4).
3. FEDWIRE AS A
FORCE MULTIPLIER
The value of the funds transferred with Fed-
wire is staggering. In 2018, Fedwire exe-
cuted 158 million transfers with an aggregate
value of $716 trillion (Federal Reserve, 2019).
While many of the fund transfers executed
by Fedwire were of small value, the aver-
age value per transfer in 2018 was $4.5 mil-
lion. By calculating a media payment value
of $36,000 and an average value of $5 million,
researchers Morten Bech and Enghin Atalay
(2010) found Fedwire payments in 2016 were
heavily skewed by a few large transactions
(p. 5226). The U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2019) esti-
mated that 2018 total gross domestic product
(GDP) was $20.5 trillion (para. 12). Fedwire
may be viewed as a kind of force multiplier for
the American economy by processing annual
banking payments at 35 times the country’s
GDP. Further evidence of Fedwire’s role pro-
moting the efficiency of American financial
markets can be seen by considering Fedwire
payments against the aggregate value of all
deposits at U.S. lending institutions - $12.6
trillion in March of 2019 (Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, 2019). Fedwire payments
for the previous year were 57 times this figure.
4. BANKING UNDER
SIEGE
When Saturday Evening Post reporter Bob
Yoder asked famed bank robber Willie Sutton
why he robbed banks, he famously quipped,
“I rob banks because that is where the money
is” (Yoder, 1951, p. 17). The simple logic
that Sutton used continues to motivate cyber-
criminals today. In an article for Forbes mag-
azine, contributing writer Bhakti Mirchan-
dani (2018) sounds the alarm for an industry
under siege, the risk of a cyber-attack on fi-
nancial services firms cannot be overstated.
Cyber-attacks cost financial services firms
more to address than firms in any other in-
dustry at $18 million per firm (vs. $12 million
for firms across industries).
Financial services firms also fall victim
to cybersecurity attacks 300 times more fre-
quently than businesses in other industries
(para. 1). Her reference to ‘300 times
greater attack frequency’ may be an
overstatement, but the point is clear: cyber-
criminals go where the money is, leaving
banks vulnerable. Mirchandani goes on to
state that in 2017 cyber-criminals stole nearly
$17 billion from banks (para. 3). In con-
trast to the likely overstatement on attack
frequency, this is probably an understate-
ment based on pervasive under-reporting of
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banking cyber breaches. International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) economist Antoine Bouveret
(2018) created a sophisticated model to pierce
through the ‘veil of secrecy’ he believes banks
cling to in under-reporting cyber-attacks.
Bouveret analyzed data from The Opera-
tional Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX)
and other banking industry data sources.
ORX’s website says the company was cre-
ated for financial institutions to, “provide
a platform for the secure and anonymized
exchange of high-quality operational risk
loss data from around the world” https:
//managingrisktogether.orx.org. ORX
houses a worldwide database of banking
losses, including those from cyber-attack.
Bouveret combined ORX data with other
cyber-attack loss data available from com-
panies such as Advisen, who also specialize
in that area. Bouveret’s model computed a
baseline case of expected losses from cyber-
attacks of nine percent of global banking net
income – $97 billion for 2016 (p.20). This is a
much larger but more defensible figure than
Mirchandani’s $17 billion. However, even
the lower figure spotlights that banking is an
industry under siege by cybercriminals.
5. FEDWIRE
NETWORK TOPOLOGY
Like other complex systems, Fedwire can be
modeled as a graph. The Federal Reserve
Branches, commercial banks, and other par-
ticipants in the system can be represented
as nodes. Payments between these entities
can then be represented as links between the
nodes. Studies of payment systems point out
an important difference they have with net-
work models of most other complex systems.
For most systems, interactions (depicted as
links) represent the transfer of some type of
workload. In contrast, payment system links
represent the transfer of capacity, not work-
load (Beyeler, Glass, Bech, Soromaki, 2007,
p. 694). Visualization of the Fedwire network
as a graph is a good way to gain an intuitive
view of the nature of Fedwire. Kimmo Sora-
maki of the University of Helsinki led a small
group of Federal Reserve and university re-
searchers in analyzing the Fedwire network
(Soramaki, Bech, Arnold, Glass, Beyeler,
2007). Using the graphical tool Pajek, they
produced a network graph of Fedwire pay-
ments for a single day in 2004 (Figure 1).
While appearing to resemble a child’s random
etching, the figure clearly shows high-value
dark links. These links highlight massive
aggregate payments to just a few financial
institutions.
Figure 1. Fedwire network, 6600 nodes and
70,000 undirected links (p. 319)
By isolating those links and the nodes that
connect them, the team was able to determine
that just 66 nodes and 181 links comprised
75% of the value of daily payments. These
core nodes and links are illustrated in figure
2. The inner ring of 25 densely connected
financial institutions is evident in Figure 2.
These institutions are completely intercon-
nected, i.e., every node in the inner ring has
a link with every other node. This is in sharp
contrast to the Fedwire network as a whole.
The study found the average degree (number
of links per node) in the network was 15. Yet
this figure can mask the fact that a few of
the core nodes have thousands of links, and
almost half of all nodes have less than four,
with 15% linked to only a single other node
(Soromaki et al., 2007, p. 325). Maximum ac-
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tive links in a completely connected network
would be N*((N-1))/2 links (where N is the
number of nodes). For 6,600 nodes that com-
putes to 21.8 million links. The researchers
found only 70,000 active links, indicating the
network is very sparse, with only 0.3% of
potential links carrying out actual payments.
Fedwire is a scale-free network. A scale-free
network is a network with most nodes having
few connections but with highly connected
hub nodes. In other words, Fedwire is a sys-
tem that connects a lot of small financial
institutions with a few banking giants. Bech
Figure 2. High-value payments of the Fedwire
network (p. 320)
and Atalay (2010), analyzed nearly a decade
of data on the Federal funds market from
1997-2006. Unlike Fedwire accounts, banks
may both borrow and loan funds through
Federal funds accounts. Larger banks typi-
cally use Fedwire to balance those accounts,
and smaller banks do not make wire pay-
ments at all. They re-book loans with cor-
respondent banks who are members of the
Federal Reserve System (pps. 1-2). The
study found that the network was “extremely
sparse” (p.10). They also determined that
the network exhibited the small-world phe-
nomenon (p.1). Lewis describes Small-world
as “a large network with a small diameter or
a small number of hops to get from one node
to any other” (Lewis, 2015, p.65).
Finally, they found strong evidence that
the network is disassortative (p.1). Most so-
cial networks are assortative, meaning nodes
link with similar nodes. We would expect
assortative networks for groups of people
with similar hobbies, professions, or locations.
Technological systems are predominantly dis-
assortative. Small systems (like workstations)
connect primarily to large systems (like inter-
net servers), not other small systems. While
Bech and Atalay’s study focused on the Fed-
eral funds market, their observations of small-
world and disassortative characteristics most
likely apply to Fedwire as well, since the
Federal funds market relies on Fedwire to
balance payments for all but the smallest in-
stitutions participating in Federal Funds. Xu,
He, and Li (2016) from Nanjing University
studied interbank markets and their evolu-
tion over time. Based on empirical evidence,
they constructed a general model of inter-
bank markets. They found the model to be
dynamic (affected by systemic shocks like the
mortgage crisis) but stable (having invariant
network topology). They summarized this
by concluding, “Interbank market network
structure evolves with time dynamically, but
the topological properties stay unchanged”
(p.138). This gives us reason to believe the
network topology of Fedwire remains con-
stant, including its small-world, scale-free,
and disassortative attributes.
6. SYSTEMIC RISKS OF
THE FEDWIRE
NETWORK
Scale-free networks like Fedwire have been
shown to have significant tolerance for ran-
dom failures but are highly vulnerable to
targeted attacks (Crucitti, Latora, Marchiori,
Rapisarda, 2007, p.394). This is because
most nodes (in the case of random failure)
have few links, but core nodes are highly con-
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centrated (in the case of targeted attacks).
As a payment network, Fedwire transfers liq-
uidity (financial capacity) across nodes via
links. Beyeler, Glass, Bech, and Soramaki
(2007) studied payment systems and found
low liquidity levels quickly cause network con-
gestion. They observed that “at low liquidity,
the system becomes congested and payment
settlement loses correlation with payment in-
struction arrival, becoming coupled across the
network” (p. 693). If a core node were tar-
geted for attack, the Fedwire network might
transition from a series of independent pay-
ment interactions between nodes to a coupled
system where payments cannot be initiated
until other payments complete. Like an en-
gine that seizes up because it is too cold,
Fedwire could grind to a glacial pace from
lack of liquidity.
7. COUNTER
ARGUMENTS TO
FEDWIRE RISKS
There are two counter-arguments to the idea
of catastrophic results from the core Fedwire
node attack. First, Fedwire core nodes are
most likely commercial banks classified by
the government as too big to fail (TBTF).
Government intervention to prop-up failing
core nodes could mitigate systemic risk to
overall liquidity and prevent congestion. The
Fed itself states this was the case with Bear
Sterns and the mortgage-crisis of 2008, Board
members agreed that, given the fragile con-
dition of the financial markets at the time,
the prominent position of Bear Stearns in
those markets, and the expected contagion
that would result from the immediate failure
of Bear Stearns, the best alternative available
was to provide temporary emergency financ-
ing to Bear Stearns through an arrangement
with JPMorgan Chase Co. (Federal Reserve,
2008).
However, while considered systemically im-
portant to the American economy by the
Federal Reserve, Bear Sterns was not one of
the commercial banks at the core of Fedwire.
Also, the Fed had the luxury of time in de-
ciding to rescue Bear Sterns since mortgages
are long-lived financial instruments. Pay-
ment systems like Fedwire operate in real-
time. Payments are only one aspect the Fed
would need to consider in deciding to rescue
a major commercial bank. It is also not clear
that the impact on Fedwire would be a com-
pelling factor in any government decisions in
determining to rescue a bank. That decision
would likely be driven by quality problems
with the bank’s lending portfolio. The sec-
ond major argument against the likelihood
of a catastrophic degradation to Fedwire is
historical. Federal Reserve economists James
McAndrews and Simon Potter (2002) stud-
ied the effects of the September 11th terrorist
attacks on the Federal Reserve.
After the attacks on the morning of
September 11, it was immediately clear to
financial market participants that general op-
erations and communications and computer
systems in Lower Manhattan were not func-
tioning well. A direct effect of these difficul-
ties was a reduction in the value and volume
of transfers on Fedwire on September 11 (p.
64). The value of total daily payments made
through Fedwire dropped by 25% to $1.2
trillion on September 11th, from the previ-
ous day’s trading of $1.6 trillion. Bank of
New York has been cited as the core Fedwire
participant most heavily degraded by the at-
tack. We can think of this as the temporary
removal of one of the 25 core nodes in the
graph of the Fedwire network. However, by
September 12th, the total payment value was
restored to $1.7 trillion. Even this major
catastrophe caused only a temporary drop in
Fedwire payments.
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8. ATTACK ON THE
BANK OF
BANGLADESH
FEDERAL RESERVE
ACCOUNT
If Fedwire is resilient to major catastrophic
events, perhaps it is vulnerable to targeted
cyber-attacks. An attack on the Federal Re-
serve account for the Bank of Bangladesh pro-
vides a recent example. According to Reuters
News Service, the Bank of Bangladesh’s cy-
bersecurity in 2016 was so bad the bank
lacked firewalls and used second-hand net-
work switches (Das Spicer, 2016, Section –
The Hack, para. 2). Even used switches were
seen as progress for the bank, which only
a decade before used an antique teleprinter
over unencrypted phone lines to send and
receive international payment instructions
(Hammer, 2018). By 2016 the bank had up-
graded its computer systems to access the
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication) financial pay-
ment network. SWIFT recommends its users
deploy multi-factor authentication (MFA) to
prevent stolen credentials from being used
by hackers. The Bank of Bangladesh did not
deploy this counter-measure – opening the
bank to attack by anyone who could steal le-
gitimate payment system credentials. Among
at least five types of malware used against
the bank was Dridex, a malware commonly
used by Russian and eastern European cy-
ber gangs to obtain credentials (The Straight
Times, 2016, para. 2-3).
After months of lurking in the bank’s sys-
tems, hackers chose the optimal time to strike
at the bank’s payment system, near the be-
ginning of a long weekend on February 4th,
2016. The hackers used legitimate employee
credentials to make 35 illegitimate requests
for about $951 million in payments. All were
immediately rejected. Reuters points to three
anomalies in the payment requests, all 35
of the messages lacked the names of “corre-
spondent banks” – the necessary next step
in the payment chain. . . That fault meant
the orders could not immediately be fulfilled.
Second, most of the payments were to indi-
viduals rather than institutions.
And third, the slew of payments that morn-
ing was out of whack with the usual pattern
of orders from Bangladesh Bank. Over the
eight months to January 2016, Bangladesh
Bank had issued 285 payment instructions to
the Fed, averaging fewer than two per work-
ing day (Das Spicer, 2016, Section – The
Hack, para. 7-8).
The hackers adapted by reformatting the
payment requests properly and resubmitting
all 35 requests. The unauthorized payment
requests were then communicated via SWIFT
to the Bank of Bangladesh’s account at The
Federal Reserve. While the Fed primarily
serves U.S. financial institutions, it also fa-
cilitates payments for other central banks,
such as the Bank of Bangladesh. The Federal
Reserve System fulfills payments through Fed-
wire as its preferred network. Had the hackers
directed their illicit payments to banks within
the Fedwire system, the payments would have
been executed immediately. But the hackers
had not opened accounts with banks con-
nected to Fedwire, so the Federal Reserve
System sought to fulfill the payments via cor-
respondent banks using payment networks
other than Fedwire.
Five payments were made from the Bank’s
accounts with the Federal Reserve in New
York to organizations in the Philippines and
Sri Lanka. Fortunately, a quick-thinking
bank clerk in the Sri Lankan bank held $20
million from being transferred (Quadir, 2016,
para. 4). He thought it a very large amount
to go to the bank’s customer, an agricultural
non-government organization (NGO). The
Fed itself held up transferring the bulk of
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the payments, $850 million, because of a
lucky break, the losses could have been much
higher had the name Jupiter not formed part
of the address of a Philippines bank where
the hackers sought to send hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars more. By chance, Jupiter
was also the name of an oil tanker and a
shipping company under United States’ sanc-
tions against Iran. That sanctions listing
triggered concerns at the New York Fed and
spurred it to scrutinize the fake payment or-
ders more closely, a Reuter’s examination of
the incident has found. It was a “total fluke”
that the New York Fed did not pay out. . .
(Das Spicer, 2016, para. 3). This attack was
directed through SWIFT, not Fedwire, but
there seems little reason it could not have
been. If the hackers had expertise in inter-
national bank payments comparable to their
hacking skills, they would have selected ac-
counts in banks that are part of the Fedwire
network but outside the United States. Even
delivering the payment requests via SWIFT
would likely have led to actual payments be-
ing made with Fedwire with this approach,
because Fedwire is the Fed’s preferred pay-
ment method to settle accounts with Federal
Reserve member organizations.
To date, only about 20% of the $81 mil-
lion in stolen payments has been recovered.
The hackers quickly transferred funds to casi-
nos in the Philippines and then withdrew
the funds in cash. Philippine authorities de-
scribe the casinos as having “no controls, none
whatsoever” (Hammer, 2018). Subsequent in-
vestigation has led to the belief the hackers
were agents of the government of North Ko-
rea (Groll, 2017, para. 1). A similar theft
of payments was reported having occurred
against Ecuadoran firm Banco del Austro
in 2015. These two incidents represent the
first known successful cyber-attacks against
wholesale payment systems (Gimbert Hunter,
2018, para. 1, 3).
9. CONCLUSIONS
Hackers nearly got away with stealing $1 bil-
lion from the Bank of Bangladesh’s Federal
Reserve account. That is a lot of incentive
for future attacks on wholesale payment sys-
tems in general – and the Federal Reserve
in particular. Fedwire is a very high-value
target, and there can be little doubt that
it will face future hacking attempts. Given
the high value of daily payments processed
by the Fedwire network, it is safe to specu-
late that financial gain from stolen payments
will be the primary motive of the hacking
community, including nation-states.
We can also envision unintended conse-
quences from successful hacking. A $1 bil-
lion payment theft against a single Fedwire
customer could shake confidence in whole-
sale payments for the entire Federal Reserve
member community. This could lead to a
type of contagion – the temporary loss of
confidence in Fedwire itself. Given the rapid
recovery of Fedwire after 9/11, it is doubtful
even this would do more than slow payments
down to a crawl for a few days. However,
even a moderate reduction in the liquidity
Fedwire provides could have a measurable im-
pact on the American economy. Payments in
Fedwire are exceptionally large in aggregate.
Congresswoman Carolyn B. Maloney, a se-
nior member of the House Financial Services
Committee, said of the attack on the Bank
of Bangladesh and the Fed, “What struck me
the most was that this action struck at trust
in the international banking system, and if
you can’t trust international banking, then
international commerce could grind to a halt”
(Hammer, 2018). A corollary to representa-
tive Mahoney’s logic is clear: if you can’t
trust Fedwire, you can’t trust the Fed. The
efficiency of American commerce depends on
that trust.
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